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1 Introduction
Economists are paying increasing attention to “factors” in job satisfaction.
Job satisfaction can aﬀect productivity, eﬀort, absenteeism, and quits. There
is an obvious interest in studying how to organize work environments in a
way that increases employee’s satisfaction and quality of life.
Studies on job satisfaction and productivity gains are based on the idea
that a satisﬁed worker is likely to give an extra-eﬀort (or to avoid absenteeism
and quits). Links between job satisfaction and quits have been shown by
Freeman (1978), Akerlof et al. (1988) and Parasuraman and Futrell (1983).
McNeily and Goldsmith (1991) report a tendency for men and women to leave
their current sales position because of dissatisfaction with diﬀerent aspects
of their jobs. Levine and Tyson (1990) suggest that increased worker par-
ticipation can lead to performance improvements. Ichniowsky et al. (1997)
ﬁnd that participatory practices increase productivity.
Labor relations can be seen as a gift-exchange in which employees ap-
preciate good intentions on the part of the principal towards building an
environment for a satisfying job, and respond by "working well". The idea is
traceable to Akerlof (1982), who started a research program that has grown
as a consequence of results from experimental economics. These results have
shown that the concept of self-interest is not enough to understand agents’ be-
havior in laboratory experiments simulating situations of strategic relations
and that we must consider, at least, altruistic motivations and reciprocity.
This last concept is an extension of the gift exchange concept: reciprocity
means that “in response to friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer
and much more cooperative than predicted by self-interest; conversely, in re-
sponse to hostile actions they are frequently much more nasty and even bru-
tal”2. Experimental results have conﬁrmed, through the reciprocity concept,
the “gift exchange tendency” and the importance of studying the determi-
nants of job satisfaction. From this point of view, enhancing job satisfaction
could be a good solution to “moral hazard” problems in labor relations, be-
cause it is possible to suppose that the higher is a worker’s satisfaction, the
higher his attention to the ﬁrm’s eﬃciency3. Inside ﬁrms and organizations,
2Fehr and Gatcher (2000).
3This theory requires that the utility function includes the reciprocity concept. The
literature oﬀers some support for this theory: Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
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problems caused by information asymmetry (i.e. moral hazards) could be
eﬃciently coped with by adopting governance models based not only on ma-
terial incentives and monitoring, but on psychological motivations as well.
The goal would be to encourage cooperation when it is possible, in such a
way as to support information exchanges and economize on information and
transaction costs4.
Both material incentives and psychological motivations aﬀect the level of
utility enjoyed by employees in labor relations. This paper includes some
management tools among the possible determinants of job satisfaction, such
as how information is spread within the ﬁrm and how workers’ opinions are
collected.
If the chance of receiving reliable information or voicing their own opin-
ions increasea workers satisfaction, then they can respond (via Gift Ex-
change) with extra-eﬀort. However, diﬀerent channels may imply diﬀerent
results, because:
 experimental results suggest that people evaluate and appreciate the
“procedure” by which something is accomplished. The literature refers
to this notion as “procedural utility”, which means, for example, that
it is not only important how much one is paid, but also the way in
which the wage is given (i.e. if payment is based on trust or incentives)
(Benz and Stutzer, 2003). In determining their eﬀort, employees could
consider not only if manager listen to their voices, but also how.
 some management tools could better receive employees claims (or spread
information). Therefore, they can be more eﬀective in creating a satis-
factory work environment. This fact, in turn, can increase job satisfac-
tion.
The volume of literature on “procedural utility” is increasing rapidly. Benz
et al. (2004) present a complete introduction to this concept and Frey and
Stutzer (2005) also oﬀer a useful analysis.
Benz and Stutzer (2003) focus on the fact that utility from pay is not
only inﬂuenced by economic outcomes (pay levels), but also by the way by
which the pay is determined ad given. The results of their empirical analysis
tie in with the notion of procedural utility, because they ﬁnd that being
consulted on pay issues contributes to employees’ well-being, as measured by
satisfaction with their pay. In this case, the procedural factor is the frequency
4See, for example, Bowles and Gintis (1998), Bowles and Gintis (2002).
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of being asked on pay issues and the dependent variable is pay satisfaction. In
this paper, I consider two diﬀerent possible channels of “procedural utility”,
not regarding pay methods: the way information is spread in ﬁrms and the
way the employees’ voice is organized. Tortia (2008) empirically conﬁrms
the idea that trust relations and fair procedures increase workers well being,
but he considers procedural utility as fairness with regard to pay, and not
procedural utility as “voice” or “info” channels.
The aim of this paper is to verify empirically whether giving voice to
employees and spreading information within the ﬁrm increase job satisfaction,
while thoroughly analyzing if diﬀerent means imply diﬀerent consequences.
2 Searching for factors in job satisfaction
Past studies have already shown that job satisfaction is determined not only
by material incentives (i.e. wages and security). Actually, most empirical
studies do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation between wage and job satisfaction.
Groot and Van den Brink (1999) assert that this is due to a preference drift,
resulting from an adaptation to higher wages. We can brieﬂy sum up previous
results on the most studied factors:
 Gender. A number of studies have demonstrated that women are more
satisﬁed with their job than men5. The main reason for this ﬁnding
could be that men and women have diﬀerent expectations of their jobs.
 Age. Sloane and Williams (2000), Clark and Oswald (1996), Blanch-
ﬂower and Oswald (2004) have observed a U-shaped relationship be-
tween age and job satisfaction.
 Marital status. People who live with a partner seem to be more sat-
isﬁed than singles, probably because married individuals are generally
happier with their lives6.
 Education. Clark and Oswald (1996), Sousa Poza and Sousa Poza
(2000) report that more educated people are likely to be less satisﬁed
with their jobs, probably due to diﬀering expectations as was the case
with gender
 Income. Although wage levels are often not correlated with job satis-
faction, some studies show that relative wage inﬂuences job satisfaction,
5Clark (1996, 1997), Groot and Van den Brink (1999).
6Blanchﬂower and Oswald (2004), Clark (1996).
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as observed by Hamermesh (2001) and Shield and Price (2002).
 Establishment size. Some studies show that people are more likely
to be satisﬁed in smaller establishments7.
The study of the variables contributing to job satisfaction can be improved
by focusing on the ﬁndings presented in the introduction: job satisfaction is
extra-material and it is necessary to search for other possible determinants
by studying psychological variables. The focus is on how diﬀerent manage-
ment features can have diﬀerent eﬀects on job satisfaction. The next section
presents the data set and the methodology used for the analysis.
3 Data and methodology
The analysis was carried out using a British data set: “Changing Employ-
ment Relationship, Employment Contracts and the Future of Work Survey
(Working in Britain 2000)”. This project was designed to identify changes
in employment relationships and the contractual basis of employment and to
examine their consequences for the future of work. The survey is based on
a questionnaire covering some subjects that are useful for the goals of this
paper, including: current main job details, organization of work, information
and communications, training, beneﬁts and working time, job satisfaction
and organizational commitment, job security and personal and family de-
tails.
The data’s technical features are brieﬂy shown in table 1 as they are
presented in the UK Data Archive site.
An ordered probit model was used for estimation. This method is appro-
priate for analyzing categorical ordered data, such as a questionnaire data
set. In an ordered probit, an underlying score is estimated as a linear func-
tion of the independent variables and a set of cut points. The probability of
observing outcome i corresponds to the probability that the estimated linear
function, plus random error, is within the range of the cut points estimated
for the outcome:
Pr(outcomej = i) = Pr(i 1 < 1x1j + 2x2j + ::: + kxkj + uj  i)
where uj is assumed to be normally distributed. The model estimates the co-
eﬃcients 1;2;:::k and the cut points 1;2;:::;I 1 where I is the number
7Bauer (2004), Idson (1990)
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Table 1: Dataset features
Coverage
Dates of Fieldwork: June 2000-January 2001
Country: Great Britain
Spatial Units: Standard Regions
Observation Units: Individuals
Kind of Data: Numeric data; Individual (micro) level
Universe Sampled
Location of Units of Observation: National
Population: Working individuals aged 20-60 in Great Britain during 2000
Methodology
Time Dimensions: Cross-sectional (one-time) study
Number of Units: 3815 (target) 2466 (obtained)
Sampling Procedures: Multi-stage cluster sample
Method of Data Collection: Face-to-face interview; Self-completion
of possible outcomes and 0 is taken as  1 and I as +1.
In ordered probit models, coeﬃcient signs have the same meaning of a
standard regression, which is not true for coeﬃcients values. To understand
the extent of the impact of changes to the independent variable on the de-
pendent one variable, it is necessary to compute marginal eﬀects. Finally,
the analysis uses the weight furnished in the data-set: it considers age, sex
and social class.
The dependent variable, Job Satisfaction, was obtained by the question:
“All in all, how satisﬁed would you say you are with your job?”, with possible
answers ranging from 1 (completely satisﬁed) to 7 (completely dissatisﬁed);
the dependent variable actually used in the analysis was built by reversing
the order of the answers in questionnaire and it represents job satisfaction as
increasing from 1 to 7.
Among independent variables there are regressors related to Individual
Characteristics:
- Female, 1 female, 0 male;
- Married, 1 married, 0 single, divorced or widowed;
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- Age and Age2, to verify the U-shaped relation reported by previous
studies;
A negative correlation between union membership and job satisfaction is
widely conﬁrmed by past studies. The causal direction of this link is unclear;
Bryson et al. (2004) found robust arguments to support the endogeneity
hypothesis, so I prefer to exclude “union membership” from the analysis.
As suggested by previous studies, wage rates turn out to be uncorrelated
with job satisfaction, so I do not include it in the ﬁnal regression, but I use
the relative wage indicator:
- Relative Wage: 1 (my wage is on the low side), 2 (neutral), 3 (my
wage is on the high side).in the analysis this variable is recoded in three
dummy cases where the reference case is the ﬁrst category8.
The dissemination of information from the ﬁrm’s management to em-
ployees could generally be positively correlated with job satisfaction, but if
procedural utility matters, employees could perceive diﬀerent means of in-
formation spreading diﬀerently, speciﬁcally with respect to their reliability.
Among the regressors there are some dummies concerning how employees
are informed about what is occurring in the organization, each one indicat-
ing (assuming value 1) whether the corresponding method is implemented in
the interviewee’s work place:
- Info notice board;
- Info news sheet;
- Info magazine;
- Info web site;
- Info e-mail;
- Info meetings with management.
The questions used to build the “info” variables are the following: “Does your
employer give you news of what is happening in the organization by any
method on this card?” (notice board, email, etc.) and “Does management
organize meetings where you are informed about what is happening in the
organization?”.
8This variable comes from a speciﬁc question on the questionnaire and it is not inferred
from interviewee’s statements about their income.
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The same observations made for info spreading channels can be used
for the subject of the employees’ voice: the more chances for voicing their
opinions, the greater their satisfaction. In this case, ﬁrms can implement
diﬀerent voicing forms, and some of them could be perceived diﬀerently by
workers and could be more or less eﬀective than others. The analysis includes
three dummies on Channels of Voice:
- Meetings with management;
- Employees groups;
- Formal suggestion schemes.
The questions used to build the “voice” variables are: “management hold
meetings in which you can express your views about what is happening in the
organization”, “organizations have groups of employees who meet regularly
to think of improvements that could be made within the organization. Are
you involved in such a group?”, “your employer have a formal suggestion
scheme?”.
The last group (Job General Features) includes all the remaining re-
gressors:
- Pay negotiable is a dummy that indicates whether pay was directly
contractible between the worker and superiors at the beginning of the
relationship;
- Public sector, 1 yes, 0 no;
- Firm size it is a categorical variable: 1 (1-10 employees), 2 (10-50), 3
(50-499), 4 (500-990), 5 (1000+); this variable will be split into dummy
cases and the reference case is the smallest dimension.
In table 2 variables means and standard errors of the all data set are
listed.
4 Results
Table 3 shows the results of the ordered probit. The variables chosen for the
analysis exclude some observations (among them all of the self-employed),
and 2.010 observations were used.
All results concerning factors related to individual characteristics con-
ﬁrm the ﬁndings of past studies (the U-shaped impact of age, the greater
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Table 2: Data description
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Job Satisfaction 2456 5.341205 1.115722 1 7
Relative Wage 2122 1.769086 .6044203 1 3
Pay Negotiable 2128 .2880639 .4529675 0 1
VOICE-meetings with management 2129 .6848286 .4646933 0 1
VOICE-employees groups 2129 .3043682 .4602474 0 1
VOICE-formal suggestion scheme 2128 .3468045 .4760647 0 1
INFO-meetings with management 2130 .7431925 .4369749 0 1
INFO-notice board 2111 .5528186 .4973202 0 1
INFO-newssheet 2105 .464133 .4988304 0 1
INFO-magazine 2114 .4063387 .4912654 0 1
INFO-website 2092 .209369 .4069555 0 1
INFO-emails 2109 .3522997 .4778 0 1
Public Sector 2099 .3006193 .4586366 0 1
Skill 2460 1.513821 1.152914 0 3
Firm Size 2121 2.60396 1.223074 1 5
Married 2466 .6634225 .4726348 0 1
Female 2466 .486618 .4999223 0 1
Age 2463 39.689 10.53904 20 62
satisfaction of women, married and non skilled workers). I checked for the
impact of the number of children in household, as some previous work has
hypothesized a relationship which I did not ﬁnd.
The General Features of a job have the “expected” signs. Larger estab-
lishments imply lower satisfaction. Working in the public sector seems to be
associated with a higher satisfaction; it is possible that public sector workers
are more likely to have chosen their vocation for non-pecuniary reasons (i.e.
in health or education services) 9. Allowing employees to negotiate their pay
seems to positively aﬀect job satisfaction. These results reﬂect the concept
that the more control individuals have over their own situations, the greater
the satisfaction. The correlation between relative wage and satisfaction con-
ﬁrms previous ﬁndings in the literature.
9For a study on eﬀects of diﬀerent organisational forms (public sector, for-proﬁt, non-
proﬁt) on job satisfaction, see Benz (2005).
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Table 3: Ordered probit results (n=2010)
Dependent Variable: Job Satisfaction
Regressor Coeﬀ. Std. Err. P > jzj signif.*
Age -.0433562 .0189021 0.022 ??
Age2 .000532 .000236 0.024 ??
Individual Married .1066829 .0567597 0.060 ?
Characteristics Female .2705765 .052162 0.000 ? ? ?
Education; O-level -.2649401 .0759884 0.000 ? ? ?
Education; A-level -.3042593 .0985875 0.002 ? ? ?
Education; degree -.2618483 .0833798 0.002 ? ? ?
Firm size 10-50 -.0966961 .0756646 0.201
Firm size 50-499 -.2250579 .0830135 0.007 ? ? ?
General Firm size 500-999 -.1715377 .1140874 0.133
Features Firm size 1000+ -.2803292 .1083192 0.010 ? ? ?
Public sector .2167845 .0614675 0.000 ? ? ?
Pay negotiable .1549217 .0596764 0.009 ? ? ?
Relative Medium .4934695 .0583914 0.000 ? ? ?
Wage High .6550636 .1066153 0.000 ? ? ?
Notice board .0240063 .0588188 0.683
News sheet -.1444419 .0586484 0.014 ??
Info Spreading Magazine .001064 .0619114 0.986
Channels Web site -.0469081 .0753492 0.534
E-mail -.0369417 .0655392 0.573
Meetings with management .2153736 .0900913 0.017 ??
Meetings with management .2667542 .0868142 0.002 ? ? ?
Channels of Voice Employees groups .1570668 .058529 0.007 ? ? ?
Formal suggestion scheme .0737847 .0586489 0.208
Wald 2
24 = 230:20, Prob> 2
24 = 0:0000; Pseudo R2 = 0:0481
Base group: man, single, no education, low relative wage, pay not negotiable, ﬁrm
size 1-10 employees, private sector, absence of voice or info spreading channels.
* signiﬁcance: ? 10%, ?? 5%, ? ? ? 1%
Finally, the results conﬁrm that job satisfaction can be enhanced by the
spread of info and by giving voice opportunities to employees. But they also
signal that the means chosen by management could be perceived diﬀerently
by workers and be more or less eﬀective.
The spread of information through impersonal or “cold” means (i.e. writ-
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Table 4: Marginal Eﬀects
Job Satisfaction Pr(1)=.006 Pr(2)=.010 Pr(3)=.048 Pr(4)=.078 Pr(5)=.416 Pr(6)=.349 Pr(7)=.093
Age :0007?? :0010?? :0037?? :0043?? :0074?? -:0099?? -:0072??
Age2 -:0022?? -:00001?? -:00004?? -:00005?? -:0001?? :0001?? :0001??
Married -:0019? -:0025? -:0093? -:0107?? -:0175?? :0247? :0173?
Female -:0045??? -:0061??? -:0229??? -:0268??? -:0461??? :0612??? :0454???
Education; O-level :0049??? :0065??? :0236??? :0268??? :0418??? -:0616??? -:0421???
Education; A-level :0069?? :0086?? :0297??? :0317??? :0401??? -:0736??? -:0433???
Education; degree :0050?? :0066?? :0237??? :0266??? :0403??? -:0613??? -:0408???
Firm size 10-99 :0017 :0023 :0084 :0097 :0159 -:0223 -:0157
Firm size 50-499 :0042?? :0055?? :0201?? :0228??? :0354??? -:0525??? -:0355???
Firm size 500-999 :0034 :0044 :0159 :0176 :0253?? -:0408 -:0259?
Firm size 1000+ :0062?? :0078? :0270?? :0291?? :0380??? -:0676?? -:0405???
Public sector -:0033??? -:0045??? -:0175??? -:0210??? -:0396??? :0476??? :0383???
Pay negotiable -:0024?? -:0033?? -:0126??? -:0156??? -:0279??? :0344??? :0269??
Relative Wage Medium -:0096??? -:0124??? -:0443??? -:0495??? -:0756??? :1133??? :0782???
Relative Wage High -:0060??? -:0092??? -:0390??? -:0534??? -:1473??? :1044??? :1505???
Info-Notice board -:0004 -:0005 -:0020 -:0024 -:0041 :0055 :0040
Info-News sheet :0024?? :0033?? :0123?? :0144?? :0244?? -:0330?? -:0239??
Info-Magazine :0000 :0000 :0000 -:0001 -:0002 :0002 :0002
Info-Web site :0008 :0011 :0041 :0047 :0078 -:0108 -:0077
Info-E-mail :0006 :0008 :0032 :0037 :0062 -:0085 -:0061
Info-Meetings with manag. -:0041?? -:0054?? -:0195?? -:0219?? -:0332??? :0506?? :0336??
Voice-Meetings with manag. -:0050?? -:0067?? -:0241??? -:0271??? -:0412??? :0624??? :0418???
Voice-Employees groups -:0024?? -:0034?? -:0129??? -:0154??? -:0282?? :0349??? :0273???
Voice-Formal sugg. scheme -:0011 -:0016 -:0062 -:0073 -:0128 :0167 :0125
Base group: man, single, no education, low relative wage, pay not negotiable, ﬁrm size 1-10 employees, private sector,
absence of voice or info spreading forms.
* signiﬁcance: ? 10%, ?? 5%, ? ? ? 1%
ten) might not be well received by employees and, probably, are even consid-
ered as a way to avoid telling the truth, as the news sheet result conﬁrms.
Conversely, workers appreciate information given “face-to-face” (meetings),
probably because this method reduces the chances of lying and allows ques-
tions to be freely directed to the management. The same observations emerge
for voice channels: employees seem to appreciate the opportunity to meet
with other employees or management and talk directly with them. There is
another possible interpretation of the data: the “chances to meet” are more
eﬀective than other channels of voice or info-spreading and they have indi-
rect consequences on job satisfaction because they make a larger contribution
toward building a satisfactory environment for workers.
Marginal eﬀects (table 4) help to clarify the diﬀerent impacts of manage-
ment features, particularly from a quantitative point of view.
The interviewed workers showed a high level of job satisfaction, as de-
scriptive statistics in table 2 exhibit (the mean is 5.4). In relative terms, the
“crucial” levels of satisfaction are the ﬁfth and sixth: an individual with base
group characteristics falls into one of these two categories in almost 77% of
the cases (see the ﬁrst row of the table). Shifting to or from the ﬁfth to
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the sixth category of satisfaction implies being under or over the average
level respectively. Hence, the most important marginal eﬀects are those in
columns Pr(5) and Pr(6), which signal that the most important factors of job
satisfaction are, in order, as follows: relative wage, education level, gender,
ﬁrm size (especially if it is over a thousand), chances to have meetings with
the management about voice claims and the sharing of information. These
“chances to meet” seem to be more relevant than being a public employee
or having the possibility to negotiate wages. With regard to the concept
of procedural utility, spreading information through news sheets and meet-
ings has diﬀerent consequences: the ﬁrst method even seems to negatively
aﬀect job satisfaction. Analogously, with regard to voice channels, meetings
with management are more appreciated than simple employee groups. Actu-
ally, “face-to-face” meetings with superiors can be considered the only really
eﬀective way for a worker to voice his concerns.
5 Conclusions
The analysis carried out in this paper conﬁrms the ﬁndings of previous stud-
ies on the eﬀects of personal conditions on job satisfaction. Moreover, the
results are compatible with predictions of studies on psychological incentives:
job satisfaction can be enhanced by spreading information in ﬁrms and by
the giving a voice to employees’ requirements and ideas. Nonetheless, it is
necessary to choose means to spread the information that is perceived as
democratic and reliable by the employees.
In particular, the analysis suggests that chances to meet with manage-
ment in person either to voice opinions or to get information from superiors
are relevant elements in determining job satisfaction. These opportunities
for a meeting can positively aﬀect job satisfaction in two ways:
 Direct Eﬀect: workers appreciate the chance, in itself, to meet with
management and this factor directly aﬀects the level of job satisfaction
(procedural utility);
 Indirect Eﬀect: meetings are more eﬀective than other means, both
for receiving workers’ claims and for spreading information, and they
provide an opportunity to organize work in a more satisfactory way.
These results could be useful indications for building a modern theory of
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Human Resource Management based on the minimization of transaction costs
due to information asymmetries or moral hazard. Creating a satisfactory job
environment could be an eﬀective way to deal with moral hazard problems in
productive units, resorting to gift exchange with workers (job satisfaction vs.
eﬀort). If this is the aim, it is necessary to implement reliable means, both
to spread information within the ﬁrm and to give the employees the chance
of voicing their claims, suggestions and opinions. “Face to face” meetings
between management and employees seem to be the most appreciated (and
eﬀective) method to achieve this target.
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